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This paper adapts Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of
‘dwelling’ in order to effect a liaison between acousmatic
music and ecological concern. I propose this as an alternative
to both the propagandist use of music as a means of
protest and to using the science of ecology as a domain
that might furnish new compositional means. I advance the
interpretation that acousmatic music ‘occupies the air’ in
ways that transform the meaning of that dimension. It allows
the sky to be sky and the earth, earth. I use the precedent
of bell ringing as an example of sonic activity that occupies
the air in order to further dwelling.
In this paper I develop a response to certain questions
raised in this journal concerning the relationship
between musical practice and the ecosystem. I believe
that, from a musicological and critical point of view,
broaching a discourse that thinks music and the
environment together is timely and advantageous,
and, I might add, such a discourse can readily be
accommodated in the recently consolidated branch
of interdisciplinary humanities research known as
‘ecocriticism’. Ecocriticism sets an urgent issue before
us: the canon of liberal political concerns – class,
race, gender, sexuality and imperialism – can be
augmented by a concern for the environment. Like
queer, feminist, critical and postcolonial theory,
ecocriticism analyses cultural documents as betraying
and concealing implicit values and ideologies that
condition our attitudes to the natural environment.
In doing this, like other theoretically and politically
motivated critiques, ecocriticism mobilises genuine
pragmatic sympathies and commitments.
‘Green values’, as we now might call them, are
on the point of becoming absolutes. Just as we would
expect no right-thinking person to accept sexual dis-
crimination, slavery, warmongering or racial prejudice
– to a large extent social and political discourse is pre-
dicated upon identifying and challenging injustice –
indifference towards the fate of the planet, the natural
environment, species diversity, pollution, global warm-
ing and so forth cannot now be tolerated. Because, as is
acknowledged now in law, the environment is an
international matter; green values have a geopolitical
universality which other concerns, relativised by local
cultural and political contexts, will never have. As such,
green values are arguably the most powerful means we
have of challenging the only other global value system
we acknowledge, capitalism.
A few months before the time of writing, in
October 2010, millions of gallons of toxic ferrous
sulphate leaked from an aluminum processing plant
in Hungary. Televised scenes of streets turned blood
red by chemical pollutant provide a graphic depiction
of the sheer scale and strangeness of the impact made
on the landscape by industrial activity. These kinds of
ecological disaster inspire shock and anger, and seem
to reveal to us the awful nature of capitalist indus-
trialisation and expansion (also called growth) as at
times irrational, rapacious and highly irresponsible.
But equally we are – apparently – dependent upon these
very same industries for maintaining our high standard
of living, for jobs, goods, transport and materials. The
leftist would also point out that occupying this con-
tradiction – which we all must do – requires an ideology
that might very well flatter some environmentalist
concerns. Parading a few inoffensive green values and
compassion towards our fellow creatures might offset
the nascent guilt of middle-class over-consumers and
opining celebrities, but it does so without ever really
addressing more fundamental questions.
I raise these issues because it seems to me that a
response in music to environmental concern, if it were
to adopt a protesting or propagandising tone, would
not in anyway elude the ideological entrapments
occasioned by late-capitalist consumption: music
could lapse into functioning as a rather effete psy-
chological compensation for what are daunting pro-
blems. Even if such a response were made, from an
expressive point of view, which is very easy to neglect,
one cannot imagine any kind of musically wrought
statement that would be proportionate or appro-
priate to the crisis at hand.1 In any case, such an
attempt would be immediately superfluous, given the
ease and speed with which the media represents,
sentimentalises or makes a spectacle of ecological
disaster. An alternative response might treat the
environmental sciences, biology and the science of
1If, as the Adornoian slogan runs, poetry after Aushwitz is bar-
barism, one might also say that it is impossible.
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ecosystem as yet another resource – or ‘standing
reserve’2 – from which to extract interesting technical-
productive possibilities. Just as fractals, Markov
chains, set theory and recursive algorithms have
enjoyed their days in the sun as compositional means,
perhaps a new family of suggestive metaphors or
processes could be extracted from the ecosystem?
However, the cynical voluntarism that such a posture
implies is obviously part of the problem: are we
destined only to ever consider the world as a resource
from which we can fund our projects?
Another response in music to environmental concern
can be taken. In what I propose many will recognise
clear sympathies with field of acoustic ecology. In a
deep sense, I am attempting to discover a poetic
imperative to musical composition (and, for that mat-
ter, scholarship) that is derived from a changed per-
ception of the living environment. I am concerned, in
other words, with ecopoiesis,3 not ecocriticism, and not
with deriving any praxial or technical directives for
composition from the domain of theory. I will take up
the thinking of Martin Heidegger and suggest that the
development of the notion of dwelling will open out a
space in thought in which another relationship of
musical sound and the environment can be revealed. My
argument has three stages: firstly, I adopt Heidegger’s
notion of the fourfold,4 a broad, highly speculative
construct which defines the nature of human existence
(or Dasein).5 The fourfold consists of the coming toge-
ther of four distinct realms of Being: the Earth, the Sky,
the Divinities and Mortals.
Secondly, I will explore the notion of dwelling,
which implies tarrying, staying in place, a locale. This
produces a further sense that is directly pertinent to
the environment, that of taking care, of vouchsafing
our place on the earth, of making it habitable, safe
and thereby allowing it, and us, to flourish.6 Sound
contributes to this sense of making a space secure, or
hallowed, and historically sound has been used to
announce and ward off perceived danger. I will refer
to Alain Corbin’s campanarian history Village Bells:
Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth Century French
Countryside (1998) by way of illustration.
Finally, I will propose that sound can – and I think
acousmatic music, despite its apparent technoscientific
trappings, can do this extremely elegantly – enchant the
air. I would go so far as to say that sound can, briefly
and in an attenuated manner, make the sky sacred7
and, in doing so, appeals to Man (Dasein) to make
ready, abide and wait. I will risk the formulation that
the continual attraction of acousmatic composition, for
good or ill, is that it enchants.
1. DWELLING
Heidegger’s definition of ‘dwelling’ is simple, it is
‘the manner in which mortals are on the earth’
(2001: 146). We build, we make spaces and invest in
them, endow them with life and meaning, because
our nature is to dwell. In Scottish English, one
asks ‘where do you stay?’ meaning where do you live
or reside? (South of the border, one says ‘where do
you live?’) Staying has a breadth of significance that
is easily lost: a temporal aspect is disclosed in the
word. To stay, as in to stay one’s hand, means to hold
back, to pause; it also means to tether and keep
in place.
A home, for example, is not simply a physical dis-
tribution of walls and doors and rooms; it is the place
that can endure for us, to which we can return, and that
gives us back our energy and identity. The home where
we dwell preserves us; we are (or should be) at peace
there, we should be protected from harm and danger. It
also, in Heidegger’s derivation, spares us. To ‘sparing’
he gives the positive sense of ‘returning something
specifically to its being’ (2001: 147).8
The Greek oikoB, which provides the prefix
‘eco’ in economics and ecology, means home and
family, the place where we dwell. And our homes
sound. Anecdotally, the precritical re-discovering of
the sonic manifestation of home is well reflected in
countless student experiments in soundscape. Given
recording equipment, many will immediately begin to
document the telling sounds of their homes. These
sounds, of course, mean nothing to the listeners who
do not dwell there, and who, in these sounds, cannot
2This is a term that is deployed in Heidegger’s essay ‘The Question
Concerning Technology’ (see Heidegger 1993: 322–3). It describes
taking a stance with respect to the environment which takes the
latter as being only a resource, as being docile in respect of human
purposes.
3The neologism ‘ecopoiesis’ I take from Kate Rigby’s article ‘Earth,
World, Text: On the (Im)possibility of Ecopoisis’ (2004).
4The usual translation of das Geviert. The ‘quadrate’ is also
adequate.
5The German word ‘Dasein’ – literally ‘being there’ – marks out
Heidegger’s philosophical approach to understanding human
existence. The being of the Human Being is accorded special
treatment by Heidegger: humans are not things amongst things (the
usual philosophical exemplum of this is the hammer), rather their
being is characterized by, for example, orientating themselves
towards making use of things and make a future for themselves,
and in taking care of the things that are present with a view to them
having a future.
6I should point out that the Human has a special role in vouch-
safing the earth. By way of comparison, one could consider the
option proposed by the ‘Voluntary Human Extinction Movement’
that humanity should engineer its dying out thus leaving the planet
free of our menacing and destructive presence.
7Making sacred implies the act of consecration. What prevails in
this consecration is making a space fitting for God (or for gods),
but also one that is holy. The deeper sense of the holy are wholeness
or health.
8‘Sparing’, in the sense of refraining from (harming) something and
letting it be, is only one sense of the word. In English, ‘sparing
oneself’ means providing for oneself, for one’s own needs. The
idiom ‘spare a thought’, which suggests remembering, and bringing
something lovingly or carefully to mind, captures Heidegger’s
meaning very accurately.
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feel themselves returned ‘home’.9 The ‘treatment’ of
these sounds as ‘material’ presents students with a huge
psychological hurdle since they must overcome their
personal signification in order to construct form.
Just as sound can define the habitus, sound can
destroy it. Sound does not respect the boundaries
upon which dwelling spaces depend. In terraced
houses and apartment buildings, noise intrudes along
echoing corridors and passes through walls, and at a
stroke destroys the distinctness of any given space.
Upon waking, the vile indifference of voices on radio
and television interrupts my returning to myself.
Even the murmurings of pipes and plumbing, central
heating and ventilation – this is brilliantly exploited
in the claustrophobic soundscape of David Lynch’s
film Eraserhead – have an uncanny disregard for how
dwelling spaces are constituted.
2. THE FOURFOLD
The doctrine of the fourfold in Heidegger is highly
speculative and many commentators shy away from
it.10 However, it shadows all his thinking about art
and poetry and needs in some way to be broached. It
asserts that dwelling is produced by the codependency
and unity of four realms: the earth, the sky, divinities
and mortals. This is asserted as the primordial essence
of dwelling. One cannot think about one of these realms
without invoking the others, but this invocation has
been suppressed or, perhaps more precisely, forgotten.
As he writes in Building Dwelling Thinking, four times
over in an incantatory refrain, ‘we give no thought to
the simple oneness of the four’ (doch wir bedenken nicht
die Einfalt der Vier) (Heidegger 2001: 147). Oneness
(and one can easily hear something spiritual or theo-
logical in that word) implies connection, integration
and harmony. Mortals are folded-together with other
beings with their life on the earth; mortals are on the
earth and depend upon the earth; the earth is laid out
under the sky – the sky holds sway over diurnal and
seasonal rhythms, and atmospheric conditions.
Of the four, we would in this structure perhaps have
the most difficulty with the presence of divinities. But it
is an ethnographic fact that human cultures to this day
will bring gods into their homes or assign to gods cer-
tain responsibilities. And in Western, secular culture it
is of course acceptable to acknowledge that we did once
populate our world with gods and divinities, and
thinking in Heidegger’s terms merely requires us to
think back (andenken). Distantly, there is in poetry,
especially lyric poetry – which is near to the essence of
song, chant, or enchantment – an echo or afterimage, as
it were, of a manner of invocation or an appeal to
intercession via dedication. In the opening of Shake-
speare’s Henry V, ‘O for a Muse of fire, that would
ascend/The brightest heaven of invention’, we already
hear little more than a poetic convention. However, the
convention is as old as European literature itself, which
appeals for divine assistance in the writing of literary
composition. In Heidegger’s sense, what matters here is
the sense of awaiting the presence of the divine, the
hopeful, watchful aspect. Any appeal to ‘inspiration’ is
a remnant of this.
Closer to our own time, when twentieth-century
painting took up the representational style of African
tribal art, it set about uncivilising itself (expression-
ism wanted to uncover an existential urgency in art)
but it also thereby occasioned a re-encountering, via
artistic representation, of primitive religious belief.
Precisely this pattern is at work in what was to be the
turning point in Picasso’s career. He came to under-
stand his own painting as a contention with profound
forces, exterior and interior. After a visit to theMuse´e
de l’Homme in Paris, where he saw African mask and
fetish art, Picasso related the following experience:
[A]ll those objects which men had fashioned with a
sacred, magical intent, as intermediaries between them
and the unknown hostile forces which surrounded them,
thus attempting to overcome their terror in giving the
forces colour and form y Then I understood that this
was the true meaning of painting. Painting is not an
aesthetic process; it’s a form of magic which is inter-
posed between the hostile universe and ourselves, a
means of seizing power, of imposing form on our fears
as on our desires. The day I understood that, I knew that
I had found my way. (Greene 1993: 495)
Picasso identified the fetish as an intermediary: this is
similar to Heidegger’s understanding of divinities. The
religious fetish, which is man-made, nevertheless holds
open a place for a spirit or a god. Projected onto these
objects is the profound vulnerability of human existence
in the face of a threatening environment, the desire for
control through form-giving and appeasement through
sacrifice. I am suggesting that something of this is
present in expressionist art. There is a sense in which the
‘painting itself’, the actual materials of which it is
composed and the form of the final image, do not cir-
cumscribe the entirety of what the painting is. For
Picasso, the painting is suspended between a human
order and an imagined ‘beyond’.
It is not my place to prove beyond all doubt any of
these formulations. They remain suggestive. I merely
try to bring closer the possibility that as we attempt
to make a place for ourselves on the earth, try to find
9A sound familiar to me is the so-called ‘hurry bell’ which rings out
at 8.35 from Glasgow University Chapel each morning to
announce the start of services.
10‘Among most readers of Heidegger, no major concept has left as
unfavorable an impression as das Geviert: the fourfold. Among
those readers who were never fans of Heidegger to begin with, the
effect is of course far worse, and the fourfold is simply dismissed as
an example of pious gibberish. As a result, most favorable com-
mentators leave it out of consideration altogether, with Heidegger’s
friends trying to prevent him from embarrassing himself among his
enemies’ (Harman 2002: 190).
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our way – to dwell. We do so by attending to other
mortals, to the earth and sky, but also, in a much
attenuated manner, by holding out hope for what
may come. Holding silence on Remembrance Sun-
day, or at a sporting occasion, is exactly this small
interruption in profane existence.
For those interested in sound, it is that part of the
fourfold which is the sky (Himmel) that matters.
Heidegger writes: ‘Mortals dwell in that they receive
the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and the moon
their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons
their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn
night into day nor day into a harassed unrest’
(Heidegger 2001: 148). There is a pious, prayerful tone
to this writing that will embarrass and irritate many.
However, the verb leave (lassen) captures my attention
because it reflects a singular disposition, that of
letting-be and non-intervention. For how can we
intervene in the sky? The weather? The course of the
stars? How can this be material that we can use up,
spoil or control? That which is above us is beyond us,
it is out of our control and we take as it is. It is
salutary to be reminded that so near to us there are
forces so tremendous that we can do nothing to tame
them. The sky is also the province of sound, including
the winds (who also used to bear the names of gods)
and the loudest sound routinely known to human
cultures, that of thunder. These sounds occupy the air
in remarkable ways. The source of the sound is
unknown or not always clear: even when lightning
strikes, thunder follows at a temporal remove – the
two phenomena separate in a remarkable way – and
fills the sky in all directions.
3. THE PARISH BELL
Until recently, the only human sound that could
compete with the sounds of the air was the parish bell.
(The word parish also comes from oikoB, para-oikos,
literally beside-dwelling.) The parish is a bounded
space at the centre of which is the church and the bell
tower. The campanarian historian Alain Corbain in his
extraordinary book Les cloches de la terre, has set out
the complex range of meanings of the sound of bells in
nineteenth-century France. The bell had a territorial
function; it organised the working day, it raised alarm
and preserved the community. It ‘anchored localism,
imparting depth to the desire for rootedness and
offering the peace of near, well-defined horizons’
(Corbain 1998: 97). Corbain continues:
In the nineteenth century, at least in the countryside, bell
ringing defined a space with which only fragmented,
discontinuous noises were heard, none of which could
really vie with the bell tower. After all there were as yet
no airplanes, which nowadays are capable of competing
with, overwhelming and, above all, neutralizing the
sound of bells. Aerial sounds have been desacralised.
Since the dawn of the twentieth century, bell and cannon
have ceased to be the sole rivals of the mighty thun-
derbolt. (Corbain 1998: 97)
The preserving – sacred – function of the parish bell
is shot through with remnants of superstition. Demons
were thought to occupy the air (and so bring disease,
storms, plagues of insects and untimely frosts). But
demons were supposed to be ‘horrified by the sound of
bells’ (Corbain 1998: 101). Bells summoned angels and
cleared a path to heaven for prayer. In the eighteenth
century, belief in the saving power of bells was wide-
spread in rural areas. Naturally, this ran into conflict
with Enlightenment rationalism and educated opinion,
and the tension between the new and the old continued
for the best part of a century. During thunderstorms,
parishioners rang the church bells in shifts. If you were
unable to attend, you were required to pay a deputy
(see Corbain 1998: 103). In 1772 the Bishop of Metz
issued a ban on ringing ‘during thunderstorms and
springtime frosts’ but this drew furious protests (Corbain
1998: 103). Even though the practice of ringing at a
storm was all but gone by the mid–nineteenth century,
between the 1860s and 1880s bells were still cast
marked with inscriptions such as pestem fugo (I drive
away pestilence), nimbum fugo (I drive away storms)
and daemones fugo (I drive away demons).
The church bell was humanity’s only means of
influence in commerce with the sky. The sky conveyed
prayers to heaven, and housed demons and angels. As
such, the meaning of the church bell is grasped in a
remarkable way by the fourfold of which Heidegger
writes: the sounding bell delineates territory, space and
sites upon the earth; it brings mortals together; it
occupies the skies and calls out to, or repels, divinities.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The entanglement of art with myth has been a con-
stant feature of the most sophisticated philosophical
thought of the twentieth century. As Adorno (Hei-
degger’s fiercest opponent) argued, art never quite
breaks free of its historical connection to pre-
Enlightenment belief since it is a human, material,
technical practice. The tortuous, dialectic interplay of
his Aesthetic Theory always compulsively entwines
the definable and technical with speculative concepts
such as enigma, apparition, the Irrlicht and Geist.
Cultural secularisation does not sign off all gods as
dead. Rather, it constructs a society where fetishism,
polytheism, monotheism and rationalist atheism sit
alongside one another in a strange uncomprehending
indifference or tolerance. There is no more specta-
cular example of the odd confusion of different
orders of belief than the strange persistence of the
Christmas festival. Nothing is so baffling as Christ-
mas: part pagan, part Christian, part communitarian,
part Victorian ideology, part consumerist frenzy.
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Liberal, secular society does not stand to gain by
eliminating either theistic belief or superstition (besides,
these are protected by the human rights legislation) and
it does not demonstrate any particular militancy in
confronting religions, except when local interpretations
and practices, such as the wearing of the burka, run
counter to more strongly held political ideology. This is
in contrast to the struggle we have already considered
between French peasantry and the urban theocracy
over the protecting power of parish bells. At stake
was actually a worldview, with modern monotheism
attempting to subdue less advanced polytheistic super-
stitions. Today, religious opinion has no particular
authority; we might well find such practices perfectly
harmless and even rather charming.
It would be easy enough to treat Heidegger’s
thought as yet another example of a quaint – but
nonsensical – philosophical hangover, one theory
amongst a panoply of New Age garbage. However, the
principle lesson I take from Heidegger is that thinking
(this includes philosophy and poetry and music) must
de-banalise the word and the world. Much religion and
new age religiosity fails to do this. But I admit, even
then, that I have been evasive and uncritical in this
paper: I have not subjected Heidegger’s writing to the
normal counter-positional challenging and resolution
that typifies a properly worked-through argument.
I confess that at some stage in preparing this paper
I abandoned the hope that the doctrine of the fourfold
was defensible at any level.
Ecocriticism occasions a new departure for aesthetic
thinking. Ecological crisis forces us to address how we
live and how we use the earth, and it is possible to
recognise that the aesthetic prefigures the qualitative
transformation of the relationship between man and
the environment. We can start to be mindful of the fact
that sound is, on occasion, something that is above us,
is of the sky, and that, on occasion, certain sounds have
split from their origin or have no perceivable origin.
The dialectic of my argument is that acousmatic music,
despite its technical advancement, communicates read-
ily with myth. Acousmatic music belongs to the air
more radically than other musical genres. Something in
it responds to a need for vastness, resonance, scale and
anonymity. An ungrounded sound, a sound without
source or body, a sound that thickens the air and
fashions impossible resonant spaces, and even, through
sheer volume and impact encroaches on places of fear
in us, will inevitably cause the air to be sacralised.11 The
consequence of this – and this is a poetic, imaginative
logic – is that briefly being on the earth is qualitatively
transformed.
I am by no means advocating a return to super-
stition, or a new parochialism. The sentimental
trappings of the religious and the ecological alike
spell disaster: there is nothing more banal than sen-
timent. What I am arguing here is that in the case
of art we are confronted with artefacts that are
only ever partly expunged of their mythical heritage.
A mythical discourse is never imposed upon art; it is
repressed, harried, denied or etiolated. The question
for aesthetic theory is how to render this trace, how
to think it. Thinking must go ever more deeply into
what is given in the historical fact of art.
Further to this, another problem comes into focus.
Have the humanities, without realising it perhaps,
succumbed to the fetish of growth; have they insti-
tutionally and procedurally committed themselves to
obscene critical over-production? To adapt a phrase
coined by the Australian political theorist Clive
Hamilton, have the humanities used up time they don’t
have to produce interpretations they don’t need in order
to impress people they don’t like?12 I permit myself to
imagine that one of the outcomes of ecocriticism is to
promote another kind of critical practice which per-
formatively rejects such overproduction, and that sets a
poetic argument against a harassing of texts and ideas
and practices to produce yet more ‘knowledge’.
The arts can make a contribution to ecology by
addressing themselves to the question that much of
our public discourse shrewdly evades: are we pre-
paring to change how we live upon the Earth? I will
seize upon that word prepare: are we readying our-
selves? Are we making ready? All the cynical remarks
about the futility of art in a time of crisis can be silenced
by that thought. A work of art is not something that of
itself is fully actual, or fully realised. Therefore, delib-
erating them in terms of immediate emotional utility or
technical accomplishment is facile. The artwork is a
thing which is readied and which readies us; it is a thing
which awaits and is open to future possibility.
REFERENCES
Corbin, A. 1998. Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the
Nineteenth Century French Countryside, trans Martin
Thom. New York: Columbia University Press.
Greene, T. 1993. ‘Poetry as Invocation’. New Literary
History 24(3): 495–517.
Hamilton, C. 2004. Growth Fetish. London: Pluto Press.
Harman, G. 2002. Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics
of Objects. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Heidegger, M. 1993. Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell
Krell. London: Routledge.
Heidegger, M. 2001. Poetry, Language, Thought, trans.
Albert Hofstader. New York: Harper Collins.
Rigby, K. 2004. Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)possibility
of Ecopoiesis. New Literary History 35(3): 427–42.11At the very least, I hope that my paper has persuaded readers
that, in terms of spatialisation, the vertical should be treated as
another dimension, as another compositional parameter; what is
above us is another domain altogether. 12See Hamilton 2004.
Dwelling and the Sacralisation of the Air 119
